Embassy in Hungary Embassy ● Roster captured ● host list

Orbán Anita külügyminiszter: "A mai napon utasításomra a Külügyminisztérium illetékes vezetője tájékoztatta Oroszország budapesti nagykövetét, hogy a magyar hatóságok értékelése szerint az orosz képviselet 10 munkatársa olyan tevékenységet folytatott Magyarországon, amely a Bécsi Egyezmény alapján diplomatától nem elfogadható." A minisztérium az orosz nagykövetség tíz munkatársát szólította fel az ország elhagyására; ez nem jelenti a diplomáciai kapcsolatok megszakítását. Magyarország korábban soha nem küldött haza ennyi orosz diplomatát egyszerre; a korábbi csendes kiutasítások Szuskov Artur (SZVR, 2026 május) és Tarakanov Andrej (GRU, 2024 június) voltak.

The Hungarian government has ordered 10 Russian diplomats to leave the country over activities described as "unacceptable for diplomats." Foreign Minister Anita Orbán said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Russian ambassador in Budapest that, according to the Hungarian assessment, 10 employees of the Russian mission engaged in activities in Hungary that are unacceptable for diplomats under the Vienna Convention. Orbán stressed that this does not mean the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia. Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said the response would be "harsh and painful" and blamed a "Russophobic lobby in Budapest". Reporting cited by Euronews says at least 15 of the 47 staff of the Russian embassy have intelligence links.

TVP World reported on September 4th that “a report published on Wednesday by independent Russian media outlet Agentstvo alleged that of the 47 staff at the Russian embassy in Budapest, 15 “are linked” to various Russian intelligence agencies, while another six “may have” such links. The outlet says many embassy employees have military backgrounds or previously worked for Russia’s Defense Ministry, while others have registered addresses in buildings that are also home to other Russian intelligence officers or have worked for companies tied to Russian security services. One such example is Vyacheslav Shmidt, who Agentstvo alleges served as chief of staff of a missile unit in the Russian armed forces in 2011. According to the outlet, Shmidt’s registered address in Moscow is in a building that is also home to three officers from Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency (GRU).”

Politiko reported on December 12th that “in late November 2022, Ukrainian special forces arrested a Russian agent on the border with Hungary. This person had secret information to be sent to Hungary stored on a “USB” and hidden in his anus. It contained stolen personal information about the leaders and personnel of the Ukrainian intelligence service, the SBU and the military service, the GRU, as well as secret information about military bases, weapons and logistics of the Ukrainian army. As it became known later, this spy would deliver this information to the Russian embassy in Budapest. Journalist Szabolcs Panyi reported the arrest for the Balkan Insight portal. He has long researched Russian espionage activities in Hungary, and says he fears that Budapest could turn into a hub for Russian espionage in the EU. Currently, 50 accredited diplomats work in the Hungarian capital, while in Prague, Bratislava and Warsaw together no more than 20 people. “It is known that many agents work disguised as diplomats, as they enjoy immunity and are not allowed to be persecuted by the authorities of the host country,” says the journalist.”

The Balkan Insight reported on November 30th that “in late November, at a Ukrainian-Hungarian border crossing checkpoint, Ukrainian special forces armed with machine guns and rifles arrested a suspected Russian agent just as he was trying to cross the state border. The man was a former employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, who, according to the Ukrainian security agency SBU’s statement, “collected classified information about the leadership and staff of the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine. The man planned to personally transfer the data to the Russian Embassy in Budapest on a flash drive”. The stolen data was partly personal information on SBU and GUR (military intelligence) officers, leaders of the Azov movement, and on military personnel of the 72nd mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The other part of the data was sensitive military information on Ukrainian army bases, arsenals, warehouses and their locations. Ukrainian Telegram channels posting video footage of the arrest mostly focused on an unconfirmed but understandably newsworthy detail: that the Russian agent had allegedly hidden the USB drive in his anus. However, the most interesting information of the SBU’s statement was about the role of Hungary and the Russian embassy in Budapest, which was apparently considered by the protagonists as a safe place for arranging such meetings. The pro-Kremlin attitude of Viktor Orban’s government — even after the invasion of Ukraine — is well documented. Most recently, together with a colleague of mine at Direkt36, we investigated the Hungarian government’s response to the war and motivations behind the policy to maintain a close relationship with the Kremlin. What we found is that through Hungary’s dependency on Russian fossil fuels, Moscow has essentially taken the Orban government hostage.”

On November 25th the Ukrainian SBU issued a press release stating that they “detained a traitor who wanted to hand over to the Russians a flash drive with data on employees of the Security Service, the Armed Forces, the State Security Service and Azov. In order to show his “usefulness” to the Russians, he collected classified information about the management and personnel of the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine. The man planned to personally transfer the data to the Russian embassy in Budapest on a flash drive. However, SBU officers detained him at the checkpoint while trying to cross the state border. With the beginning of the full-scale aggression, the traitor lived on the territory of Bila Tserkva, was an active supporter of the “Russian world”, but was guided not only by ideological motives. In particular, he expected to become the “chief policeman” of the capital and the Kyiv region in the event of the capture of the region. This person was in direct contact with the Russian saboteur Igor Bezler, and also maintained friendly relations with other representatives of the so-called “DNR militia”. It was on their “tip-off” that the detainee began to collect classified data about employees of the Security Service of Ukraine, State Security Service, leaders of the “Azov” movement, as well as servicemen of the 72nd separate mechanized brigade of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was established that, in addition to the files of the Ukrainian “security forces”, he also collected information about important sites of the Armed Forces: bases, warehouses, arsenals, and their locations. During the searches, a Makarov pistol, symbols of the terrorist organisation “DNR” and the communist party banned in Ukraine, were found in the possession of the person involved in the criminal case. All seized materials have been sent for examination.”